court dismissed the second and third counts. 19 The parties stipulated to the factors the Court should consider in sentencing, resulting in a fifteen to twenty-one month range according to the Guidelines. 20 The court sentenced Mistretta 2 ' to an eighteenmonth prison term followed by a three-year term of supervised release. 2 2 The district court also imposed a $1,000 fine and a $50 special assessment. 23 Mistretta appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Before the Court of Appeals heard the appeal, both Mistretta and the United States petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari. 24 The Court granted certiorari because of the strong public importance of rational sentencing 2 5 and because of the disagreement among the district courts. 26 The Court addressed the constitutionality of the United States Sentencing Commission and the Guidelines promulgated by it.27 III. BACKGROUND
A. THE DOCTRINE OF UNLAWFUL DELEGATION OF POWER Article I of the Constitution states that "all legislative Powers
19 Johnson, 682 F. Supp. at 1035. 20 Brief for Respondent-Petitioner Mistretta at 1, Mistretta (Nos. . 21 Before the court sentenced Mistretta, he moved to have the Guidelines invalidated as a violation of due process because they interfered with a trial judge's sentencing discretion. Mistretta argued that the Guidelines prevented sentencing judges from considering relevant factors. The district court denied this motion, concluding that the Guidelines allowed the court to consider all factors that could make a difference favorable to the defendant. Brief for Respondent-Petitioner Mistretta at 5, Mistretta (Nos. 23 Id. 24 The parties petitioned for certiorari pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1982) , which allows direct appeal to the Court from any court of the United States which holds a congressional act unconstitutional in a civil action in which the United States is a party. 25 The United States noted that this decision "will affect a large percentage of all the criminal cases that reach judgment in the federal system." Brief for Petitioner-Respondent United States at 15, Mistretta (Nos. . The Guidelines will govern sentencing for most felonies and misdemeanors committed on or after November 1, 1987, and ultimately would have been applied in approximately 40,000 cases every year. Petition for Certiorari by United States at 9, Mistretta (Nos. . 26 Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 654. The constitutionality of the Guidelines was challenged in more than 400 cases, and the district courts were sharply divided on this issue. As of May 11, 1988 , 21 district courts had upheld the Guidelines and 29 had held them unconstitutional. Petition for Certiorari by United States at 9, Mistretta (Nos. . 27 Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 649.
.. shall be vested in a Congress of the United States .... , 28 As a result, "it is a breach of the National fundamental law if Congress gives up its legislative power and transfers it to the President, or to the Judicial branch ... "29 Such delegation is unconstitutional because the legislature cannot transfer law-making power "for it being but a delegated power from the people, they who have it cannot pass it over to others." 3 0 Courts 1 and commentators 3 2 have suggested that the nondelegation doctrine preserves congressional accountability. Despite the strong words of this doctrine, the Court corsistently has permitted congressional delegations of authority 3 3 as far back as 1813. . 31 The nondelegation doctrine "ensures to the extent consistent with orderly governmental administration that important choices of social policy are made by Congress, the branch... most responsive to the popular will." Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (invalidating OSHA's power to promulgate standard because it exceeded statutory authority); see also Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 626 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting in part).
32 John Hart Ely has argued that "by refusing to legislate, our legislators [escape] the sort of accountability that is crucial to the intelligible functioning of a democratic repub- Similarly, Judge Skelly Wright has noted that when Congress cannot deal with a problem, "it passes some 'soft' statutes which throw the mess into the lap of an administrative agency... at the expense of democratic decisionmaking." Wright, Review: Beyond Discretionary Justice, 81 YALE LJ. 575, 585-86 (1972) . 33 In only two cases has the Court held a congressional delegation excessive and unconstitutional. See infra notes 44-46 and accompanying text for discussion of these cases.
34 Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1813) (permissible for Congress to grant to the President power to declare by proclamation that either Great Britain or France ceased violating neutral commerce with the United States, which effectively revived sections of the expired non-intercourse act of 1809). In Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 682, 691 (1892), the Court relied on Brig Aurora to uphold a delegation of tariff-making power to the President. Writing for the majority, Justice Harlan stated, "That Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President is a principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution." Id. at 692. However, the Court held that the President's power to suspend tariff provisions favorable to a country was executive and not legislative power. Id.
35 276 U.S. 394 (1928) . See supra note 29 for discussion of this case.
"intelligible principle" and directed delegatees to conform to it. 36 The Court has since applied this "intelligible principle" standard to uphold a wide range of delegations, even though some delegations have been general and given the delegatee broad discretion. Such constitutional delegations have included authority to fix prices 3 7 and rates, 38 determine water rights, 39 and regulate broadcast licensing. 40 The Court upheld these delegations largely because of congressional inability to deal with technical, expert, or large fields. 4 t Thus Congress had provided a general policy on which the delegatees had premised their authority. 42 The Court rationalized this type of delegation as in the public interest. The Constitution vests legislative power in the Congress, 47 executive power in the President, 48 and judicial power in the Supreme Court. 4 9 These grants establish a separation of governmental powers. James Madison espoused that this separation of powers guarded "against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department." 50 The Court, asserting that the three . The Court held that this section did not set a standard but rather gave the President "unlimited authority" to determine policy. Id. at 415. The Court enumerated a three-pronged test for deciding when a delegation had been excessive: 1) whether Congress had declared a policy with respect to that subject; 2) whether Congress had set a standard for the President's action; and 3) whether Congress had required any finding by the President in the exercise of the delegated judicial authority.
Id.
46 Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 533. The Court held that the NIRA was unconstitutional. Section 703 of the NIRA allowed the President to approve industry codes of fair competition. Once approved, such codes were to "be the standards of fair competition for such trade or industry." 15 U.S.C. § 703 (1933) . The Court invalidated § 703's code-making authority as an unconstitutional delegation. Schechter Poulty, 295 U.S. at 551. The Court distinguished previous decisions upholding seemingly equally vague standards because, unlike this section of the NIRA, they included constraining procedures. Id. at 532-33. branches be largely but not totally separate, 5 1 uses the separation of powers to safeguard against one branch's encroachment or aggrandizement at the expense of another. 5 2 This doctrine prevented the exercise of arbitrary power by creating friction through distributing the government's powers among three departments. 53 However, the Supreme Court has consistently followed the Madisonian interest in a flexible separation of powers standard. The doctrine does not imply that the branches cannot have "partial agency in, or ... controul [sic] over the acts of each other," but rather "that where the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution, are subverted." 54 Thus, the three branches need not be totally distinct. 5 5 Applying this flexible approach, the Court has approved delegations that partially mixed branches' tasks but had not allowed one branch to aggrandize another's power. 55 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 121 (Constitution does not contemplate total separation of the three branches of government); Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 442 n.5 (1977) (upholding delegation of power to the General Services Administration to control presidential papers after resignation because the delegation did not prevent the executive from achieving its constitutional functions); Youngstown Sheet & Tube, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring) (The Constitution "contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.").
56 See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988) (upholding the judicial appointment of independent counsel because this appointment authority did not impermissibly interfere with the President's powers); CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986) (upholding agency's assumption of jurisdiction over state-law counterclaims because it involved narrow class of actions, the agency's power was restricted, and the agency was subject to congressional review).
57 See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (congressional power of removal over executive branch official violated separation of powers); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. but only two as unlawful delegations of powers.
C. THE SENTENCING COMMISSION AND THE GUIDELINES
In 1984, Congress created the United States Sentencing Commission as an independent body of the judiciary. 58 The Commission promulgates guidelines which determine sentences based on criminal history and current offense and specify binding ranges for prison terms. 59 The Commission consists of seven voting members appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. 60 At least three of the members of the Commission must be federal judges 6 1 who may serve concurrently as judges and Commissioners. 6 2 The President may remove a Commission member "only for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office" or if other good cause is shown.
63
The Sentencing Guidelines should "provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing" while "avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct" and "maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences." 64 The final Sentencing Guidelines are a matrix defining a sentencing range for every offense by using a scoring system in which points are added or subtracted according to characteristics of the crime or of the offender. 65 Although the Guidelines are binding on the courts, a sentencing judge may forgo the applicable guideline if he or she finds an aggravating or mitigating factor that the Commission failed to consider adequately when formulating the guidelines. 6 6 The judge In Mistretta, the Court held that Congress' delegation of the power to formulate sentencing guidelines for federal criminal offenses to a Sentencing Commission did not violate the constitutional principles of nondelegation and separation of powers. 68 In the majority opinion, 6 9 justice Blackmun stressed that Congress laid down a sufficiently intelligible principle to guide the Commission. Furthermore, the Commission's location in the judicial branch, its judicial component, and its membership by presidential appointment did not violate the separation of powers principle.
7 '
Delegation of Power
Justice Blackmun used the "intelligible principle" test to determine whether or not congressional power delegations to and requests for assistance from different governmental branches survive delegation of powers restrictions. 72 This test permitted congressional delegation of legislative power where Congress had first laid down an intelligible principle to which the delegatee must conform. 73 The test's flexibility allowed Congress to function in an increasingly complex society. 74 Justice Blackmun noted that, with two exceptions, 7 5 the Court has never invalidated a challenged statute on delegation grounds.
76
Applying this "intelligible principle" test, the Court found that Congress sufficiently had specified and detailed the Sentencing Commission's authority. 7 
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with three specific goals and four clear purposesJ 8 It also had set out that the Commission should develop guidelines to regulate sentences 79 and had listed certain uses of sentencing ranges. 80 Congress also had formulated detailed instructions for establishing offense and offender categories. 8 ' The Court acknowledged that although Congress had allowed the Commission significant leeway in formulating the Guidelines, the Commission might not establish policy. 82 However, it might have decided the relative severity of crimes, determined which had been punished too leniently or severely, and developed categories of similar offenses. 83 Justice Blackmun, approving this magnitude of discretion, relied upon Yakus v. United States 84 which had permitted bodies with congressionally delegated power to find facts and draw inferences where standards guide their actions and courts could determine whether or not congressional goals had been met. 8 5 Justice Blackmun argued that Congress had more than met this standard by delineating the Commission's policies, rules, and procedures and by indicating methods for handling specific sentencing situations. 8 6 Reinforcing the conclusion that the delegation of power was acceptable, he maintained that the development of detailed sentencing guidelines for hundreds of crime and offender classifications had necessitated a complex fact-finding effort for which an expert body was particularly well-suited.
87
78 Id. Congress stated that the Commission's goals should be 1) to "assure the meeting of the purposes of sentencing as set forth" in the Act, 2) to "provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records ... while maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences," where appropriate, and 3) to "reflect to the extent practicable, advancement in knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal process." 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1) (Supp. V 1987). Congress specified the Commission's four purposes as 1) "to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense," 2) "to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct," 3) "to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant," and 4) "to provide the defendant with needed ... 
Separation of Powers
The Court held that the Guidelines did not violate the separation of powers doctrine. Justice Blackmun reviewed the fundamental principles of the doctrine to validate the constitutionality of the Sentencing Commission as part of the judicial branch. He stressed the Court's traditional adherence to the Madisonian view that the three branches of government were separate yet interdependent. 8 8 The Court explained that the purpose of separation of powers was not to compartmentalize rigidly each branch but rather to prevent " 'the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other.' "89 In applying these principles, the Court has held as unconstitutional statutes which had empowered one branch with authority appropriately spread among all three or which had threatened one branch's authority. 90 However, Justice Blackmun noted the Court has upheld statutes which had mixed the functions of the branches but had "pose[d] no danger of either aggrandizement or encroachment.-9 1 Furthermore, Congress might have delegated to the judiciary nonadjudicatory functions that had not threatened the authority of another branch and had been "appropriate to the central mission of the Judiciary. ' 9 2 The Court held that concerns over the distribution of power among the branches raised by the Commission's responsibilities and composition were constitutionally unpersuasive reasons to require its invalidation. In examining these responsibilities and composition, the Majority held that the Commission's location within the judicial branch did not violate separation of powers. 94 Justice Blackmun noted that although judges appointed through Article III of the Constitution might not serve concurrently in executive or administrative positions, 95 the Court has "recognized significant exceptions to this general rule and.., approved the assumption of some nonadjudicatory activities by the Judicial Branch." ' 
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Court's power to promulgate federal rules of civil procedure 9 7 and the judicial branch's power to administer the business of courts through judicial councils. 98 Because these extrajudicial activities and organizations relate closely to the judiciary's responsibilities, the judiciary was the appropriate branch for their administration. 99 The majority thus justified that the Sentencing Commission's placement within the judicial branch complied with separation of powers principles. 1 0 0 Justice Blackmun noted that judges have played primary roles in sentencing. 10 1 Furthermore, like the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Sentencing Guidelines bound judges and courts in exercising their powers. 10 2 Although the development of sentencing guidelines required more political judgment than the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 0 3 Justice Blackmun observed that the Guidelines did not engender too much political activity.1 04 They did not govern public behavior or afford the judiciary with legislative authority to establish penalties for every crime. 10 5 The majority also noted that the Commission was fully accountable to Congress, subject to the President's limited removal powers, and beholden to the notice and comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act.' 0 6 It was neither a court nor some other type of body able to exercise judicial power. 1 0 7 Thus, the Commission's position within the judicial branch did not enhance its power or threaten another branch's authority.' 0 8
The Court also ruled that Congress' requirement that the Commission be partly composed of federal judges who would share their authority with non-judges did not interfere impermissibly with the judiciary's functioning. 1 0 9 Active federal judges might constitutionally serve on commissions. Hayburn's Case,112 the Court generally had agreed that although neither courts nor judges acting as part of a court could have assumed administrative duties, individual judges acting as commissioners could have accepted such tasks. 1 1 3 The Court noted that "judges serve on the Sentencing Commission not pursuant to their status and authority as Article III judges," but solely because the statute requires the President to appoint such judges.
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The Court then rejected Mistretta's claims that mandatory service ofjudges on the Commission would have weakened the judiciary and that policymaking by Article III judges would have threatened judicial impartiality.
1 5 The Court noted that no judge had been appointed to the Commission against his or her consent and that the President most likely had lacked authority to force an unconsented appointment. 1 6 In addition, Justice Blackmun maintained that federal judges' participation in the development of the Sentencing Guidelines had not affected their or other judges' impartiality on sentencing issues.1 7
The Court struggled with the petitioner's claim that the judiciary's encroachment in the political development of the Sentencing Guidelines weakened public confidence in judicial impartiality. " 8 The Court stressed that the judicial branch had drawn legitimacy from its "reputation for impartiality and nonpartisanship."'' t9 Justice Blackmun concluded that the participation of judges in the Commission had left undisturbed this appearance. 120 The task of the Commission was to develop rational guidelines for a process performed exclusively by the judicial branch. 12 1 Therefore, significant judicial participation in the Commission was appropriate. In sum, the Court held that the Commission's composition, its placement in the judicial branch, and its presidential authority over its members' appointments and removals did not violate the separation of powers doctrine.
B.
DISSENTING OPINION
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia agreed with the majority that the Commission complied with the "intelligible principle" standard for delegation of power. 129 However, he rejected the "intelligible principle" standard as irrelevant to the decisiori because the Sentencing Commission served a legislative function unrelated to the exercise of judicial power. 130 Justice Scalia asserted that the Commission's existence violated the separation of powers doctrine. ' 3 '
Delegation of Power
Justice Scalia deemed the Guidelines as "legally binding prescriptions governing application of governmental power against private individuals . . . heavily laden .. .with value judgments and policy assessments."' 1 2 He recognized that it is important for the legislature to decide basic policy questions. 1 33 However, the dissent argued that the judicial and executive branches also necessarily had decided some basic policy questions. 13 4 Thus, the Court has upheld all but two congressional delegations of power 3 5 based on a "public interest standard."' 13 6 Justice Scalia conceded that the Commission had sufficient congressional guidance and, therefore, did not violate the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation.
13 7
Separation of Powers
Justice Scalia rejected the majority's contention that the Guidelines complied with the separation of powers doctrine. 138 Because the delegation of powers doctrine was so flexible that many congressional acts satisfied it, he urged that doctrines such as separation of powers, which deter excessive delegation, must be rigorously enforced to rein in excessive delegation. 39 Justice Scalia reasoned that most congressional delegations had been constitutional because the executive and judicial branches inherently possessed some policymaking discretion, not because congressional burdens had necessitated delegation.14 0 He noted that the Court had upheld congressional delegation of discretion to administrate and execute laws to other branches.14' could have pronounced the same sentence for abusive sexual contact terrorizing a child as for unlawfully entering or remaining in the United States. Similarly, the Guidelines had permitted equivalent sentences for drug trafficking and violations of the Wild FreeRoaming Horses and Burros Act. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
133 Id. at 677 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
tion thus had prohibited the "creation of a new branch altogether," a "junior-varsity Congress," or a "body which is not Congress, and yet exercises no governmental powers except the making of rules that have the effect of laws."' 15 4 Because the Commission violated this framework, he concluded it was an unconstitutional violation of separation of powers. 155
V. ANALYSIS
Judicial participation in the Sentencing Commission and in the promulgation of the Sentencing Guidelines violates the separation of powers doctrine in at least two respects. First, the Guidelines represent the judiciary's impermissible legislative action, because precedent reveals that sentencing decisions are legislative in nature and because the Commission's promulgation of the Guidelines violates general nondelegation principles. Second, judicial participation in the Commission threatens judicial autonomy and impartiality. However, altering the Commission's responsibilities and composition can meet separation of powers requirements while retaining the benefits ofjudicial input to the Commission and to the Guidelines.
A. THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES VIOLATE SEPARATION OF POWERS

BECAUSE THEY ARE LEGISLATIVE
The Commission's promulgation of Sentencing Guidelines violates separation of powers because the Court has decided that sentencing decisions are legislative.' 5 6 Because thejudicial branch may not legislate, 15 7 such promulgation is beyond judicial power. Also, the Guidelines violate the basic test for permissible delegation, for they contain "matter which is properly... regarded as legislative in its character and effect."1 58 The majority failed to address whether or not the delegated power was legislative. Although Justice Scalia 
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referred to this issue to support his dissent, the legislative nature of the Guidelines is even clearer than he described, thereby justifying their unconstitutionality.
The Court consistently has defined sentencing decisions as legislative.' 5 9 Only Congress can define criminal offenses and prescribe punishments. 60 In addition, only legislation approved by both Houses may limit federal judges' sentencing discretion.
The Guidelines prescribe punishments, are not promulgated by a legislative act, and are not approved by the House of Representatives. Therefore, the Commission's promulgation of the Guidelines violates separation of powers because they are beyond the scope of judicial powers.
Alternatively, the Guidelines also violate separation of powers because they fail the INS v. Chadha test for appropriate exercise of legislative power. 16 2 They contain matter which is properly regarded as legislative in character and effect; actions are legislative in character and effect when they "[alter] the legal rights, duties and relations of persons." 163 Congress exclusively has the authority to set basic policy decisions.' 64 The Guidelines contain basic moral judgments about appropriate levels of punishment.' 65 Also, the Commission's elaborate decision making process indicates that the Guidelines were created through a distinctly legislative method.
166
159 See supra note 156 for these definitions. 160 Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 689 (1980) ("within our federal constitutional framework the legislative power, including the power to define criminal offenses and to prescribe the punishments to be imposed upon those found guilty of them, resides wholly with the Congress"); see also 180 Guidelines judges may also try to correct errors they perceive in the Guidelines through their cases.
The Court's ability to decide constitutional questions regarding civil procedure rules is not analogous to its ability to decide challenges to the Guidelines. The Court's power to promulgate civil procedure rules is justified by its expertise of procedural rules and its inherent procedural rulemaking role.' 8 ' These justifications are inapplicable to sentencing. As noted above, the Court has emphasized repeatedly that determining sentencing ranges are legislative dominion.' 8 2 Though courts may consider the advice and practices of otherjudges when imposing sentences, setting sentence ranges is not an inherent judicial function like the promulgation of court rules. 1 8 3 Also, civil procedure rules provide for fair adjudication rather than favoring one outcome over another.1 8 4 The Guidelines, on the other hand, specifically set particular levels of punishment to carry out particular goals of deterrence and retribution.
Moreover, judicial participation in the promulgation of the Guidelines undermines the judiciary's reputation for impartiality. The judiciary draws legitimacy from this reputation. 85 Judicial de-the Guidelines. Thus, service of three judges in such a Commission is enough to threaten the loss of independence and impartiality to the entire judiciary.1
92
The majority and commentators cite recusal as preventing judicial partiality.' 9 3 However, recusal does nothing to alleviate the effect the judge's service on the Commission has on the impartiality of other judges.1 94 Also, "[g]iven the prevalence of guidelines issues, the participating judges could be at risk of disqualification in nearly every criminal case."' 9 5
Service by judges on the Commission thus creates the potential that these judges will not decide future Guidelines-related cases impartially. Judicial promulgation of the Guidelines also damages the public's perception of judicial impartiality and influences other judges' acceptance of the Guidelines.
C. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
Several solutions to correct and salvage the Commission and the Guidelines exist. To prevent the Commission from unconstitutionally legislating, Congress could further limit the Commission's policy judgments. Congress should make more of the basic decisions about which goals, such as retribution and punishment, to favor in which cases.
In addition, to prevent judges who have served on the Commission from later presiding over cases governed by or challenging constitutionally the Guidelines, Congress can either require that the Commission's judicial members be retired judges or restrict these members from deciding cases governed by the Guidelines while or after serving on the Commission. However, as noted above, such 192 In In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1988), the Court of Appeals found that a "Special Court" consisting of three federal judges to appoint and supervise an independent counsel to investigate the actions of various government officials violated separation of powers. "Intimate involvement of an Article II court in the supervision and control of a prosecutorial office undermines the status of the judiciary as a neutral forum." Id. at 516. In discussing this case, one of the district courts found that "service by three federal judges on the Sentencing Commission even more severely undermines the status of the judiciary and involves them even more intimately with the executive branch." United States v. Estrada, 680 F. Supp. 1312, 1332 (D. Minn. 1988) (see supra note 166 for further discussion of this case).
193 Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 672 (1989). 194 Tolbert, 682 F. Supp. at 1527; Estrada, 680 F. Supp. at 1335 ("given the interest in staffing important commissions with knowledgeable and highly respected judges, commission appointees are likely to be those with the greatest potential to influence other judges"); Comment, supra note 179, at 1013. 195 Estrada, 680 F. Supp. at 1335.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The impermissible .delegation of legislative power and potential weakening of judicial impartiality make the Guidelines unconstitutional. The Court has held sentencing decisions to be legislative because they encompass basic value judgments. Judicial independence is threatened by giving judges a stake in nonjudicial activities. Judicial impartiality is threatened by allowing judges who serve on the Commission to decide cases related to the Guidelines. Other judges who do not serve on the Commission may be influenced by the judicial members' stamp of approval on the Guidelines. Also, the potential solutions are drastic and undoubtedly difficult for the individual judges involved, who may be required to give up a large number of cases. However, these solutions will preserve the benefits of federal judicial input to sentencing decisions while eradicating the separation of powers problems.
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